Introduction
Modern technologies and work organizations require continuous upgrading of worker skills, which is best accomplished via on-the-job training. Some on-the-job training improves skills speci…c to the …rm providing it, but some improves the worker's general skills. For example, Lynch and Black (1998) …nd that over 50% (but not all) of U.S. …rms provide and pay for general training such as computer skills training and teamwork training. By improving trainees'earning capability across jobs, general training creates persistent income dispersion among ex ante identical workers with di¤erent training experiences. Given that these different training experiences are largely due to …rms' di¤erent training decisions, the latter demands further investigation.
In a perfectly competitive market, …rms will not pay for general training (Becker (1962) ).
With market friction, a …rm may pay for general training because workers'job mobility is restricted and the …rm can earn rents on its trained workers. In other words, restrictions on worker mobility are key to …rms'training decisions. However, job-to-job transitions are a signi…cant phenomenon in real life. The coexistence of …rm-provided general training and frequent job-to-job transitions calls for a model that can accommodate both. In this paper, I develop such a model by integrating human capital theory and job search theory. The model generates cross-…rm comparisons that are consistent with the data. It also yields new insights on wage dispersion and wage dynamics.
To address job-to-job transitions, I draw on Burdett and Mortensen (1998) (BM), who explicitly model job turnovers with search frictions: with a given probability, unemployed and employed workers receive wage o¤ers from …rms with vacancies. To incorporate …rms' training decisions, I extend BM by allowing the …rm to post a training opportunity as well as a pay rate per unit of human capital. 1 The combination of these two elements determines the value of a job o¤er for the worker. Although …rms are ex ante identical, there is a nondegenerate distribution of job values o¤ered in equilibrium. Firms di¤er in their training and pay rate decisions. Only some but not all …rms provide training. When training is provided, the …rm and the worker share the cost and bene…t of training. Firms with training make o¤ers that yield higher values to workers. By o¤ering higher values to its workers, training …rms are more likely to keep their workers for longer, which justi…es their provision 1 Training refers to general training in this paper.
of training. Consistent with the data, the model predicts a positive correlation between …rm size and the likelihood of general training, and a positive correlation between wage growth rate and average tenure within a …rm. It also provides a new way to explain the positive correlation between within-…rm wage dispersion and within-…rm mean wage.
At the worker level, a worker's wage grows over time because she climbs up the job ladder via on-the-job search, and because she becomes more productive via on-the-job training.
Although workers are ex ante identical, at any point in time, wage dispersion exists because 1) identical workers are paid di¤erently, 2) workers di¤er in their productivity ex post, and 3)
there is a positive correlation between pay rate earned and human capital level. The positive correlation results from the fact that more experienced workers …nd better-paying jobs and they also accumulate more human capital. By decomposing the wage into human capital and pay rate per unit of human capital, the model yields a distribution of wages with a long declining right tail, as observed in the data. Due to di¤erent training levels across …rms, workers with the same years of work experience may di¤er in their actual human capital due to di¤erent training experience. Moreover, regardless of the worker's current employment status, her entire work history (not only her years of experience) matters for her future wage pro…le. This leads to important implications for wage dispersion and wage persistence.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section reviews the literature.
Section 3 lays out the model. Section 4 analyzes the market equilibrium. In section 5, I
endogenize the growth rate of human capital by allowing …rms to choose the intensity of training and show that the main results still hold. Section 6 summarizes model predictions and relates them to the empirical literature. The …nal section concludes the paper. The appendix contains some proofs. More detailed proofs are contained in the online appendix.
Related Literature
This paper is related to various studies that have focused on di¤erent aspects of the following issues: training and job turnovers, wage dynamics and wage dispersion.
In Rosen (1972) , there is an implicit market for training opportunities that is dual to the market for jobs. The worker pays for training by "buying" the job from the …rm. To explain the existence of …rm-funded general training, Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) draw on worker heterogeneity and information friction. The superior knowledge about its workers' ability encourages the incumbent …rm to fund general training. 2 In Moen and Rosen (2004) , some …rms provide general training because they have the comparative advantage in doing so.
There are a few papers that incorporate general human capital into similar job turnover frameworks as in my paper. 3 This model also contributes to the discussion about wage cuts over voluntary job-tojob transitions. Workers may take wage cuts on transition as an investment for better job prospects in the future. For example, in the o¤er matching framework developed by PostelVinay and Robin (2002), the return to such investment is realized when good luck strikes and the worker is poached by a highly productive …rm. In my model, a worker takes a wage cut in return for more training and hence higher wage growth.
The Model
In this section, I will analyze the basic model in which …rms'training decisions are binary.
Later in the paper, I will extend the model and allow …rms to choose their own training 2 Katz and Ziderman (1990) use similar arguments to explain …rm-provided general training. 3 Quercioli (2005) considers …rms'decisions on speci…c training in a BM framework. 4 I also abstract from wage-tenure contracts studied in Burdett and Coles (2003) and Stevens (2004) .
intensities.
Basic Framework
Time is discrete. There is a continuum of risk-neutral workers and …rms, each of measure one. On entering the market, each worker is endowed with one unit of human capital.
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Human capital is general, and for simplicity, I assume it does not decay. All workers retire and leave the market for good with probability per period. Each retired worker is replaced with a new unemployed worker, so that the economy is in steady state. unit of human capital it employs. If a worker has been exposed to training for t periods during her life, her human capital is h = (1 + g) t : When a worker with human capital h is employed at a job with ( ; d), the current wage she receives is h, and (p dc)h is the …rm's per period pro…t from the worker. With probability per period any given job is destroyed. With probability per period, a job o¤er arrives for the worker, regardless of her employment status. Job destruction, job o¤er and retirement are mutually exclusive events, and ( + + ) < 1: For an unemployed worker with h; she obtains bh each period, where p > b > 0: Hence, b can be viewed as the productivity of human capital in home production.
Since there is worker retirement, for simplicity, I assume no discounting. Since pay rate is measured by e¢ ciency unit, I assume that a …rm o¤ers all new employees the same binding contract. I also assume no recall should a worker quit or reject a job o¤er.
Worker Problem
Let V ( ; d; h) denote the expected lifetime income of a worker who has h units of human capital and is employed at a …rm that o¤ers ( ; d). Clearly, a worker who accepts any job o¤er will never freely quit employment into unemployment. Therefore, if the job does not 5 In this paper, I use e¢ ciency unit and unit of human capital interchangeably.
o¤er training, i.e., d = 0, the job value is:
As long as she stays on a job with ( ; d = 0), the worker gets for each unit of her human capital and the level of her human capital stays constant, which corresponds to the …rst term in (1) . The next period, with probability , the worker gets a new o¤er, upon which she chooses between staying with the current …rm or moving to the new …rm, which is the second term in (1) . With probability , the worker is laid o¤, which is the third term in (1) .
If hit by the retirement shock, which occurs with probability , the worker leaves the market with a continuation value normalized, without loss of generality, to zero. And …nally, if no shock of any sort occurs, the worker stays with the current …rm (the last term in (1)). If a job o¤ers training, i.e., d = 1, the job value is:
The value of unemployment for a worker with human capital h is:
Due to the linearity of these value functions in h, I de…ne the per-e¢ ciency-unit value 
For the unemployed, 6 The events that can happen to the worker are the same as when she is on a job with no training, except that her human capital grows at rate (1 + g):
where v and v are the upper and lower bounds for job values in equilibrium and will be speci…ed later. It is assumed that (1 )(1 + g) < 1, which guarantees boundedness of the value functions.
In case of indi¤erence, I assume that an unemployed worker accepts the job o¤er but an employed worker stays with the current employer. Given these harmless tie-breaking restrictions, optimal job search implies the following strategies for the worker:
1. When unemployed, the worker accepts a job o¤er if it has value v v u ;
2. When employed with contract ( ; d) that delivers v, the worker quits if and only if a job o¤er is received with value v 0 > v.
Given training/no training, i.e., d = 0=1, it is simple to show that there is a unique pay rate that can yield the job value v. De…ne such pay rate by d (v), for d = 0; 1.
For any given v, a worker can always compute 0 (v) and its relationship with 1 (v).
Lemma 2 Given v, the worker demands 1 (v) = 0 (v) g(v 0 (v)) in order to be indi¤erent between a job that o¤ers pay rate 0 (v) but no training and a job with pay rate 1 (v) and training. The gap between 0 (v) and 1 (v) is increasing in v:
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When o¤ered a job with training, the worker is willing to pay the amount of the bene…t she can get from her human capital accumulation on the job. As such, wage cuts may occur over voluntary job-to-job transitions, as seen in the data. 8 Moreover, if the job is of higher v; the worker is o¤ered more for each unit of her human capital. In that case, accumulating human capital is more rewarding and so the pay rate on a job with training would be even lower for the worker to remain indi¤erent to a job that does not. 7 The proofs for Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 are in the online appendix. 8 For example, Connolly and Gottschalk (2008).
Firm Problem
Let u be the steady-state unemployment rate and E(hju) be the average human capital level of unemployed workers. Let Pr(v 0 < v; h) denote the measure of workers with human capital level h that are employed at jobs with value lower than v. So the joint distribution of (v; h) among employed workers is Pr(v 0 < v; h)=(1 u): The expected human capital level that can be employed by a …rm with v (denoted by l(v)) is:
where I(:) is an indicator function that equals 1 if the argument is true, and 0 otherwise. With probability the …rm meets a worker, it can attract an unemployed worker if the promised v is no less than v u , and the expected human capital level of this worker is E(hju): Likewise, an employed worker would be attracted to the …rm if she currently works at a job with value less than v, and the expected human capital level of this worker is
The worker leaves the …rm when the job is destroyed, when she retires, or if she receives an outside o¤er with value higher than v. Hence the separation rate for a …rm o¤ering v is:
For a …rm with job value v, the steady-state ‡ow pro…t is given by:
If the …rm does not provide training, it extracts (p ) from each e¢ ciency unit it employs for as long as the worker stays at the …rm. If the …rm provides training, besides pay rate , it pays cost c for each e¢ ciency unit per period. In return, the e¢ ciency units it employs grow at rate (1 + g); hence, its pro…t also grows at the same rate. The constraint guarantees that the …rm keeps its promise of delivering v per e¢ ciency unit to the worker.
The …rm's problem can be decomposed into two steps: …rst, it chooses the value v it will deliver to the worker; second, it chooses the most e¢ cient combination of and d to deliver v. With the pay rate function d ( ), the second-step problem boils down to the choice of d, and the …rm's problem can be written as
where
Optimal Pay Rate-Training Contracts
Lemma 3 Given the promised value v, with pay rate
a …rm providing training earns the same pro…t as a …rm o¤ering wage 0 (v) and no training.
Proof. It follows from equalizing the right-hand sides of (6) and (7) and solving for 1 :
The last term on the right-hand side of (8) represents the expected future gain for the …rm from the increased human capital. Instead of fully internalizing the cost of training through cutting the pay rate by c, the …rm is willing to bear the part of the cost that is equal to its expected bene…t. Since it is constrained to deliver v to the worker, the …rm can decide on training provision by comparing the pay rate demanded by the worker, i.e., 1 (v), and the pay rate necessary for equal pro…t, i.e.,
Proposition 1 Given the value v it has promised to its worker, the …rm's optimal training where
is the worker-…rm joint bene…t from training.
Proof. To keep its promise of v, the …rm has to give the worker 1 (v) should it choose d = 1.
when o¤ered a job with d = 1, the worker demands a higher pay rate than the pay rate that maintains the same pro…t the …rm gets when it o¤ers no training. Therefore, it is cheaper for the …rm to deliver v with ( 0 (v); d = 0) rather than with ( 1 (v); d = 1).
, the …rm is indi¤erent between o¤ering training and not o¤ering it. The rest of the proof is obtained once I combine the expressions of 1 (v) (from Lemma 1) and (8)).
Given the promised v, the choice of whether to o¤er training is based on the comparison between the cost of training and the worker-…rm joint bene…t from training. This joint bene…t equals the sum of the amounts that the two parties are willing to pay for training. Search frictions enable the …rm to pay a pay rate lower than the worker's marginal productivity.
Hence, the …rm and the worker share the rent from the accumulation of general human capital, and consequently, they also share the cost.
Lemma 4
The worker-…rm joint bene…t from training, B(v), is increasing in v.
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At a higher v, both the …rm and the worker are more willing to pay for training. For the …rm, o¤ering the worker a higher v keeps the worker for a longer time and extracts more from her, which justi…es its investment in training. Given a higher value per unit of her human capital, the worker is rewarded more for her human capital and hence she will have greater willingness to pay for training. Therefore, B(v) is increasing in v.
Combining Lemma 4 with the fact that training cost c is a …xed value, there will be three di¤erent cases with respect to the optimal training decisions, depending on the value of c.
u denote the highest value and the lowest value o¤ered in a market where no …rm 9 See Appendix A for the proof.
o¤ers training, and let v 1 u denote the lowest value o¤ered in a market where all …rms o¤er training.
all …rms will optimally choose not to o¤er training. 10 Case 2: If
all …rms will choose to o¤er training. ; the economy will be divided into a training sector and a non-training sector. In the former, …rms provide training and higher job values. In the latter, …rms do not provide training and jobs are of lower values.
13 10 The equality follows from the fact that
The derivation of v uses the fact that given the most generous o¤er, the worker will never quit. 11 The equality follows from the fact that 0 (v u ) = b:
4 Market Equilibrium De…nition 1 A market equilibrium is:
1. a job o¤er distribution F of the expected lifetime per-e¢ ciency-unit value v, such that:
That is, any contract o¤ered maximizes the …rm's pro…t and the maximized pro…t is equalized across optimizing …rms;
2. an optimal pay rate-training contract
3. workers'optimal job search and quit strategies; A more detailed analysis of market equilibrium can be found in Appendix B. There I …rst derive the steady-state human capital distribution among unemployed workers. I show in Appendix B1 that beyond the basic human capital level (h = 1), the measure of workers declines exponentially and converges to zero as the level of human capital increases. As long as the human capital growth rate is not too high relative to the retirement rate, i.e.,
(1 + g)(1 ) < 1, the average human capital remains …nite. In Appendices B2 and B3, I
derive the joint distribution of job values and human capital among employed workers and
show that there is a positive correlation between job value and worker productivity.
Expected Human Capital Employed By Firm v
Denote 
Claim 1
The expected human capital level in a …rm with value v, l(v);is given by:
It is easy to see that l(v) is increasing in v: higher value jobs can employ more human capital. 15 Two forces drive this result: …rst, by o¤ering a higher value v, the …rm attracts more workers and keeps its workers longer, i.e., its hiring rate is higher and its separation rate is lower. Second, a …rm with job value v attracts workers employed at jobs with values lower than v, and their average productivity is higher when v is higher. Therefore, the model predicts that conditional on training/no training, …rms that pay more are likely to be larger, have lower turnover rate and more productive workers. Moreover, since higher v …rms are more likely to provide training, the likelihood of training is positively correlated with the …rm's size, the average tenure and the productivity of its workers.
Job O¤er Distribution
From the standard arguments as in BM, the following lemma must hold.
Lemma 5 Any equilibrium market distribution of job o¤ers, F (v), is continuous, has a connected support, is bounded below by v u , and bounded from above by v; and v <
The following propositions are shown to hold in Appendix B.
Proposition 2 In a market equilibrium, the steady-state job o¤er distribution is given as follows:
14 See Appendix B for the proof. 15 In the case where no …rm provides training (v However, as shown in the proof, the distribution is still continuous. The distribution given here involves endogenous variables 1 (v c ), 0 (v c ) and s c , but it can be expressed in primitives and is unique given parameter values.
Proposition 3 A market equilibrium exists and is unique.
Depending on parameter values, the market equilibrium could feature universal training provision, no training at all, or training in only some …rms. But for given parameter values, there exists a unique equilibrium. 16 Although all …rms earn equal pro…ts in the equilibrium, if parameters are such that …rms di¤er in their training decisions, only those located at the higher end of the F (v) distribution, i.e., those with v v c , will o¤er training. 17 Within the training/non-training category, …rms with higher v o¤er higher pay rates. When the worker makes a job-to-job transition, she will always move to a job with higher v: Therefore, she will never move from a training job to a non-training job. If she moves to a job with the same training opportunity, the pay rate on the new job must be higher. If she moves from a non-training job to a training job, although she is better o¤, she might experience a wage cut on transition. 18;19 Given the optimal strategies of the worker and the …rm, I show in Appendix B that the shape of the distribution of human capital among workers features an exponential tail, which guarantees that the expected human capital in the population is …nite. 16 Details on how to express the market equilibrium in primitives are in the online appendix. 17 For example, when training cost is neither too high nor too low. 18 A formal discussion of wage cuts over job-to-job transition is available in the online appendix. 19 As shown later, in the general case where …rms choose training intensities, …rms with higher v will o¤er more training; and workers will move to jobs with more training than their current jobs.
Wage Distribution Among Employed Workers
In the online appendix, I derive the joint distribution of the two components of wage: pay rate and human capital. From the joint distribution, I have the following …nding:
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The longer a worker stays in the training sector, the higher her human capital level is, due to on-the-job training, and the higher her pay rate is, due to on-the-job search. Therefore, we see a positive correlation between pay rate and human capital for workers employed at a pay rate higher than or equal to 1 (v c ); the lowest pay rate in the training sector. However, workers with pay rates lower than 1 (v c ) must be in the non-training sector. Other than the newly born workers, the only potential in ‡ow to the non-training sector is unemployed workers, whose jobs have been destroyed with equal probability regardless of their human capital levels. Moreover, all unemployed workers use the same reservation value. Therefore, the pay rate a worker obtains is not correlated with her human capital level, as long as her pay rate is lower than 1 (v c ):
Given the distribution of pay rate and human capital, we can now study the distribution of wages. Let Q(w) be the distribution of the wages earned by employed workers, where wage w = h: Let f ( ; h) be the joint density of ( ; h) across employed workers, and we have
Di¤erentiating with respect to w yields the density of wages:
Two properties of Q 0 (w) are immediate and insightful. First, consider the left tail of Q 0 (w):
If w 2 [ ; (1 + g)), the worker cannot have human capital higher than 1; otherwise her wage must be at least as high as (1 + g): Therefore, for w 2 [ ; (1 + g)); Q 0 (w) = f (w; 1); i.e., the marginal distribution of the pay rate holding human capital constant at 1. Since the 20 See Appendix B for the proof.
marginal distribution of the pay rate is similar to the pay rate distribution in BM, it can be shown that Q 00 (w) is positive in this region. Therefore, the density of wages earned by employees is increasing when the wage is su¢ ciently low. Second, consider the right tail of Q 0 (w): If w becomes large, since the pay rate is bounded above by , it must be that the human capital level is large, i.e., h ! 1 as w ! 1: The conditional distribution of the pay rate Pr( 0 jh) converges to Pr( 0 j1). Moreover, since human capital distribution declines exponentially as shown in the appendix, the distribution of wages must decline at the same rate. Therefore, the wage distribution in this model exhibits a density with an interior mode and a long decreasing right tail.
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Extension: Endogenous Growth Rate
In the basic model, I assume that the …rm's choice of training is binary. In this section, I relax this assumption and allow the …rm to choose its training intensity or, equivalently, the growth rate of its employed human capital. This extension will improve the model's capability to capture patterns found in the data.
Assumption:
The per-e¢ ciency-unit cost of training that increases human capital at rate (1 + g) is represented by cost function C(g). It satis…es (1)
C 00 (:) > 0 and (4) lim g!g C 0 (g) = 1, where g is such that (1 )(1 + g) = 1:
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Endogenizing the choice of g has no e¤ect on the …rm's optimal choice of v: given v, the competitiveness of the …rm in the labor market is independent of the speci…c content of its contract. Therefore, I focus on the optimal pay rate-training contract problem for a …rm that has already promised v:
The …rst constraint is the promise-keeping constraint: the right-hand side of the constraint is the pay rate that the worker demands in order to be indi¤erent between a job without growth and one with growth rate (1 + g). Since l(v) is constant given v, and the promise-keeping constraint is always binding, the maximization problem is equivalent to
Proposition 5 When the choice of g is in the interior, @g=@v > 0, that is, …rms that o¤er higher v also o¤er a higher growth rate.
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Now, I show the conditions under which the solution g is in the interior. From the proof of Proposition 5, the …rst-order condition implies:
8 <
:
Case ( In sum, when the …rms are allowed to choose the human capital growth rate under a convex cost function, the optimal growth rate g is non-decreasing in v, and strictly increasing in v when g > 0. This is consistent with the result from the basic model in which the …rm's choice is restricted to be binary.
Summary of Model Predictions
In this section, I will summarize some of the important predictions from my model and 
Wage Dispersion Across Workers and Wage Persistence
Since wage w = h, the variance of log wages among ex ante identical workers can be written as var(ln(w)) = var(ln( )) + var(ln(h)) + 2cov(ln( ); ln(h)):
In my model, wage dispersion across workers exists because 1) identical workers are paid di¤erently, 2) workers di¤er in their productivity ex post, and 3) to magnify wage dispersion, there is a positive correlation between pay rate earned and human capital level. Burdett, Carrillo-Tudela and Coles (2009) also derive a decomposition of wage dispersion similar to that in (14) . The crucial di¤erence between their model and my model is the correlation between years of work experience and human capital. With exogenous learning-by-doing, the correlation is perfect: after controlling for experience and other worker characteristics, wages di¤er only because some workers are luckier and get better draws of pay rates than others (reason 1)). 25 In my model, due to di¤erent training levels across …rms, workers with the same years of work experience may have di¤erent human capital, and all three reasons for wage dispersion still exist among observationally equivalent workers.
In the standard on-the-job search model as BM, observed wages out of unemployment are independent of the workers'wage histories: a lucky draw enables the worker to enjoy higher wages only until she is laid o¤. Conditional on unemployment, history does not matter for a worker's future wage pro…le. In my model, wage persistence exists even after job destruction because higher wage earners are, on average, more productive. A worker's work history, not only her years of work experience, should always matter for her wage pro…le. In particular, past training should have persistent e¤ects on a worker's wage. This prediction is supported by the data. For example, using information on the entire work histories 25 As a result, the residual wage distribution will have an increasing and convex density as in BM.
(including unemployment spells) of young people, Lynch (1992) …nds that past training has a signi…cantly positive e¤ect on a worker's wage at the current job, after controlling for years of experience, tenure and other worker characteristics. within-…rm wage variance and within-…rm mean wage. In their model, this is because more productive …rms have greater monopsony power and o¤er lower wages to unemployed workers than less productive …rms do. At the same time, they poach the employees of the less productive …rms by o¤ering them a better future value. My model provides a di¤erent explanation of this empirical fact. First, given the same training intensity, a …rm o¤ering a higher pay rate will keep its worker longer. This leads to a greater di¤erence in tenure, hence a greater di¤erence in human capital levels and wages, between senior workers and junior workers. Second, to magnify this e¤ect, better jobs o¤er higher growth rates. Holding the di¤erence in tenure …xed, the di¤erence in human capital levels between a senior worker and a junior worker is greater when the growth rate is higher.
Wage Growth
Training
The existence of …rm-funded general training suggests the existence of frictions in the labor market that restrict worker mobility. by previous empirical studies (see Bishop (1996) for a comprehensive literature review).
My model also predicts that when training is provided, the …rm and the worker share both the cost and the bene…t of training. Bishop (1996) reviews eight di¤erent types of evidence and con…rms that cost sharing exists. In his review, Mincer (1989) summarizes that the estimated e¤ects in terms of earnings received with an additional year of training range from 4:4% to 11%. Barron et al. (1997) and Bishop (1991) …nd that employers claim training is valuable with other …rms, but their measures of productivity growth associated with training exceed wage growth by a factor of ten. These …ndings suggest that both the worker and the …rm bene…t from training. However, in line with the literature on …rm training (Stevens (1994) ), the provision of general training is lower than the socially optimal level because of the externality of training. 26 
Conclusion
This paper develops a model in which ex ante identical …rms decide, in addition to their pay rates, whether or not to provide costly training that improves their workers'general skills.
Combining on-the-job search and endogenous training, the model explains the coexistence of …rm-sponsored general training and frequent job-to-job transitions. It helps to explain the correlations between various …rm characteristics found in the data. It also yields new 26 A formal discussion of the e¢ ciency of training provision can be found in the online appendix.
insights on wage dynamics and wage dispersion.
Search frictions enable the …rm to share the rent from its workers'general human capital accumulated via training. Therefore, the …rm and the worker share the cost of training.
Although …rms are ex ante homogeneous, they di¤er in their training decisions. Firms with more training make o¤ers that yield higher values to workers. Therefore, they are likely to be larger and have lower turnover and more productive workers. Wage growth di¤ers across …rms, and it is positively correlated with the within-…rm average tenure. Endogeneous training also helps to explain the positive correlation between within-…rm wage dispersion and within-…rm mean wage.
Although workers are ex ante identical, wage dispersion exists because 1) identical workers are paid di¤erently, 2) workers di¤er in their productivity ex post, and 3) there is a positive correlation between pay rate earned and human capital level. By decomposing the wage into human capital and pay rate per unit of human capital, the model yields a distribution of wages with a long declining right tail, as observed in the data. Due to endogenous training, observationally equivalent workers may di¤er in their productivity. A worker's entire work history, not only her years of work experience, matters for her future wage pro…le.
There are several interesting extensions to the current model. The most straightforward extension is to introduce worker heterogeneity. When workers have di¤erent productivity ex ante, worker …xed e¤ects have to be considered in the decomposition of wage dispersion.
One can also introduce …rm heterogeneity either through productivity or through training cost. For example, …rms with lower training cost would provide more training, which implies higher wage growth. Extensions along these lines will be useful in empirical applications.
A more di¢ cult extension is to allow more ‡exible pay rate structures. 27 One way is to allow …rms to backload wages, as in Burdett and Coles (2003) and Stevens (2004) . In this case, a contract would consist of a wage-tenure pro…le along with training intensity. In …rms with general training, workers with longer tenure are, on average, more productive, and hence more valuable for the …rm. Training …rms, therefore, will have an even greater incentive to backload wages and reward loyalty than non-training …rms. Within a training …rm, junior workers earn less than senior workers not only because they are less productive, but also because their human capital is "priced down" (they pay more for their training).
27 I thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
Appendix A A1. Proof for Lemma 4
Proof. Rearrange terms
A2 Proof for Proposition 5
Proof. FOC with respect to g:
This is equivalent to
Assume interior solution, de…ne
by convexity of C ( ) ;
From
since the future value of a job o¤er is positive, and that pro…t is positive in equilibrium.
Therefore, Proposition B1. In the steady state, the distribution of human capital is given by the following: For the lowest human capital level h = 1,
For all n 1,
And for any h = 2 f(1 + g) n g 1 n=0 ; D(h) = 0: The mean human capital in the whole market in the steady state exists and is …nite:
and the mean human capital among unemployed workers is: Without loss of generality, I will characterize the end-of-period human capital distribution, beginning-of-period distribution can also be derived in a similar way.
Unemployment sector: when h = 1, because I am characterizing end-of-period distribution, the human capital level of workers in the training sector is at least (1 + g), the in ‡ow of (1; u) is composed only of workers who are laid o¤ from the non-training sector with human capital 1 and the new entrants, while the out ‡ow consists of workers that either retire or …nd a job. Equating out ‡ow with in ‡ow,
For h 2 f(1 + g) n g 1 n=1 , the in ‡ow of (h; u) consists of workers that are laid o¤ from either employment sector with human capital h, while the out ‡ow is the same as before,
Employment sector without training: for all h, workers with (h; 0) leave this group if they …nd a job in the d = 1 sector, or if they leave the market or if they are laid o¤, hence separation probability is s c = + + (1 F c ). Since workers in sector d = 1 will never go directly down to sector d = 0, only unemployed workers will join this group if they …nd a job in this sector:
Employment sector with training,
, workers in sector d = 1 with h will leave this group for sure regardless of whether they stay or leave this sector, (if they stay, their human capital becomes h(1 + g)). Those who were in d = 1
moves into (h; 1) group as long as they stay in the training sector. Workers who were unemployed or employed in non-training sector with human capital h 1+g will join this (h; 1) group if they …nd a job in the training sector.
In the whole economy:
and for h 2 f(1
The relationships between the measure of workers with human capital h in the unemployment sector, in the non-training sector and in the training sector are as follows:
Solving the equations (22) to (26) gives us the distribution as speci…ed in the proposition. This is indeed a distribution because 8h 2 f(1
The mean of human capital is
The assumption that (1 + g)(1 ) < 1 guarantees y(1 + g) 2 (0; 1), and therefore the expectation is …nite. Using the relationship between uD u (:) and D ( ), one can get the expression of the average human capital among unemployed workers.
28
B2. Joint Distribution of Job Values and Human Capital
Proposition B2. The measure of workers with human capital h who are employed at jobs with values no greater than v is given by:
where s(v) = + + (1 F (v)) is the separation rate for …rm v:
28 More detailed proof is available from the author on request.
for n 1;
Proof. 
Notice that the …rst term is the measure of workers with human capital (1 + g) n in the non-training sector, i.e.,
comes from workers, unemployed or employed at lower value jobs, who have human capital 
where the last equality follows from the relationship between uD u (h) and
For n = 0, since workers in the training sector have human capital at least as high as (1 + g)
at the end of any period,
The joint distribution of job values and human capital among employed workers is Pr(v The denominator is positive, and the numerator is equal to Given the relationship between ( ; h) distribution and (v; h) distribution, one can see that ( jh) distribution must preserve the …rst order stochastic dominance property of (vjh)
when the pay rate is paid by some training …rms. is the same as F (v c ) in (12) :
